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POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

7020 JIU
11-159-1249
5-4-10-1-4

*Category:

* Dossier No.:

Subject: REINTERROGATION OF BERGER, Gottlob, General of the Staff 33

Country: Germany

Coordinates:

From: Team 11, 7020 AF Counter Intelligence Unit, USAF.

Report No.: 11-159-1249. Number of Pages: 5 Reference: Request No. 574 (Specific)

Report Date: 5 December 1949 Information Date: November 1949 Evaluation: C-3

No. Inclosures:

Prepared by: Henry Nelson

Source of Information: General Gottlob BERGER

Distribution: 5 Copies Rq. OSI, District No. 1

1 Copy Team No. 11 File

1. On 28 and 29 November 1949, General Gottlob BERGER was reinterrogated at the Prison in LAEDERBACH/Lech (4609N-1055E) in compliance with Specific Request No. 574, dated 23 November 1949.

2. In reference to the initiation of an intelligence network proposed with FIR 11-131-0949, the following additional information is hereby submitted. The detailed plan is reported in form of an exact translation from the notes BERGER prepared in the presence of the interviewing Agent:

ORGANIZATION "T"

(1) Military and Political Considerations

The WEST line can never be held by the Allies. It has to be either the REIFT or the ODER. This question was settled the day THURINGIA was conceded to the Russians.

a. Offensive plans against the West have been prepared by German General Staff officers and for that reason special emphasis is laid on THURINGIA; there is no country in the world which, from the point of view of General Staff work, has been gone over as minutely as THURINGIA.

b. The East disposes of a unique concentration area in the ODER-NEISSLER region, with the concentration area BOHEMIA as flank protection. Every Russian infantry division is able within three (3) days, a cavalry division in (10) ten, an armored division in seventeen (17) days, to install itself with weather protection and livably in any kind of forest, so that they can hold out for months. The depopulation of the area is a favorable factor. Poles who live there, are still holding on to their old homesteads in Poland.

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c. The Russian superiority in armored units is so vast in the early stages that the planned delaying action in the WESTPHALIA area will very soon turn into an organized flight.

d. It is erroneous to believe that a strategic concentration of France's and the Benelux countries divisions will have a threatening or deterring effect on Russia. The reverse will happen. Russia counts on the communist infection of the French Army and rightly so. The French Army lost face in 1940; how difficult it is to regain it, I (HENRI) learned through my experience with the French volunteer division Charlemagne.

(2) Although the clash which is to be expected will be finally decided not in Europe but in the Near and Central East, Germany is important. I (HENRI) consider that the formation of German divisions is impossible under present circumstances. On the other hand, it may be feasible to create an organization which would be able to:

a. Tangibly harass the Russian advance through the entire territory of the Reich.

b. Carry out intelligence work in the occupied territory.

c. Serve as competent guides in cases of military operations, large-scale employ of parachutists and airborne troops.

A digression may be permitted here:

The new Russian way of conducting war will contain all sorts of surprises. Among other things, it includes the use of Air Force units with strong task forces of parachutists and airborne troops, as well as the use of partisans. Two entirely different objects which have only the two military direction in common, must be discerned:

Parachutists are to go into action against military objects of any kind, under the command of capable officers.

Partisans have tasks of a political nature connected with military operations. Led by Commissars, they are to carry on propaganda in cooperation with the German communists and the groups of professional criminals, camouflaged as members of the VVN (Association of Nazi Victims). The basic aim is the elimination of all Germans resistance.

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Parties of guides are already being made up, and individual guides chosen, from among returned POW's and communists. Both actions are of a nature to considerably impede Western conduct of war, at least in the beginning. Very heavy losses are unavoidable if the defense is insufficient. Whoever knows how to listen in LUKASZEC, hears a good deal, the more so since all these things have been tested by the Russians in the last phase of the war. Through General VIASGOV all the principal orders were in my (BERGER's) hands in 1945. Another remark which may not appear quite credible, should be made:

- (a) No mistake should be made about the will to fight existing in Germany. It is very, very small. Hatred and bitterness have sprung up, but there is no fighting spirit.
- (b) One should not think that soldiers recruited in Eastern Germany may possibly be used in action against the West. Stalin will never run that risk. The entire Russian Army is completely standardized. A standard division in Siberia is exactly the same as a division in Czechoslovakia or one on the Persian border. The German soldiers, and probably those from Poland and Czechoslovakia, will be used in distant theaters of war. Their transport without arms and equipment is very easy and devoid of danger. In the West Siberians and Bomads will be used, and the world will be surprised to hear how these people will fight--because they and the Rhine are the rich Western countries with unimaginable wealth as booty.

(3) The Organization.

Should the above evaluation of the situation be accepted as fairly accurate, it is proposed to form an active defense (Wehr) organization. This can be done in two ways:

a. A pure counter-intelligence organization which at a later date is to be reinforced and armed. In other words, the intelligence service will develop into a force of soldiers ready for action in the rear of the enemy.

b. Grouping volunteers for the purpose of action when Germany is over-run. Intelligence will be a secondary matter, but will become important with actual operations.

This organization must be built up in the West and the East. First of all in the border areas. In view of the present situation I (BERGER) should give preference to the second (b) proposition. It is certain that the German power dispose of a network of intelligence; therefore there will be no lack of incoming news. Further, every intelligence, to function properly, requires at least eight (8) months of preparations and that is a lot of time these days.

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Proposition two (2) is something new which:

- (a) Will assure a military intelligence service in case Germany is over-run.
- (b) Will, through harassing of the rear, contain strong military forces from being used at the front.

(4) Necessary Time for Establishment of the Organization:

One (1) year of earnest work.

(5) Forces:

For the entire southern sector (MAIN river line) 35-40 men should be in full-time employment, all other payments only to cover expenses. They should be modestly equipped with plain motor cars. Work should in the main line be honorary. Although America is rich and these payments could probably be charged to competition costs, my knowledge of the people and my experiences make me insist on this point. It is impossible to carry on a fight in the rear of the enemy without idealism.

(6) Build-up:

Establishment of a commercial or trading company. The managers must be representatives of a Land or a large district also in Eastern Germany. The company must pay its own way. In this way trips are camouflaged, and the addressing of individuals does not attract attention. Should the difficulties in Eastern Germany be particularly great, at least guides for parachute units from the West should be selected and trained.

(7) Military Organization: In squads, platoons, companies, battalions.

No larger units should be formed. Battalions will be joined into squads. The squad communicates directly with military headquarters.

Squad: 1 chief, six (6) men.

Platoon: Three (3) to five (5) squads, according to terrain and objectives.

Company: Three (3) to five (5) platoons.

Battalion: Three (3), maximum four (4) companies.

If the country is over-run, every unit has its command post in its own area and constitutes a permanent fighting element which goes into action inclusive of the squad commander.

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(8) First Target:

Looting of leading personalities in East and West, after having ascertained from the chief of staff which areas are particularly important.

(9) Composition of Units:

Squad: 1 chief, 1 radio operator, 1 messenger, four (4) men.
Platoon Staff: 1 chief, two (2) radio operators, three (3) to five (5) messengers (one for each squad).
Company Staff: 1 chief, three (3) radio operators, three (3) to five (5) messengers, 1 doctor.
Battalion Staff: 1 chief, 1 adjutant, also deputy, three (3) radio operators, three (3) to five (5) messengers, 1 doctor, 1 medical assistant.

Details concerning selection of personnel, their training and operations can naturally only be discussed after the Commander-in-Chief has expressed his serious interest in the scheme. I (BEEGER) am in a position to draw on the experiences of the "black" (secret) Reichswehr from 1924 to 1930, and on my knowledge of the totality of the Russian partisan-war orders with supplements up to 1944 (the latest dated 7 May 1944).

(10) Use of the Letts, Estonians, Ukrainians, perhaps also Czechoslovaks, actually domiciled in Germany. Their training as parachutists and partisans. Only selected volunteers. The very fact of such a training would bolster up the courage of those fighting a lost battle in the East. And it may prove to be the best move to counteract the new assignment of Marshal Rokossovski.

3. The above outline of General BEEGER's plans and ideas is the result of a two (2) days interview. Should higher Headquarters decide on a further development of his proposition, BEEGER would be willing to cooperate in any way desired.

APPROVED:

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